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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 In this appeal, we must determine whether the District 
Court properly exercised its power to dismiss a case pursuant 
to the forum non conveniens doctrine when it dismissed 
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Appellant’s claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 
(2012), and general maritime laws for unseaworthiness, 
negligence, and maintenance and cure.  We shall affirm the 
District Court in two steps.  First, we hold that the general 
presumption that “[t]he possibility of a change in substantive 
law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even 
substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry,” Piper 
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 247 (1981), applies to 
these claims (a) because the remedy provided by the alternative 
forum is not clearly inadequate and (b) because the Jones Act 
does not contain a special venue provision.  Second, we hold 
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in exercising 
its forum non conveniens power (a) because the District Court 
correctly determined that an adequate alternative forum existed 
and (b) because the District Court reasonably balanced the 
relevant private and public interest factors.  
I. 
 This case arises from the following facts.  Luis A. Rubi 
(“Rubi”), a U.S. citizen, serves as the Director of 7R Holdings, 
LLC, a limited liability company with its principal place of 
business in Puerto Rico.  7R Holdings holds 7R Charters 
Limited.1  7R Charters owned M/Y Olga, a yacht registered in 
the British Virgin Islands (“BVI”).  Bernard Calot captains 
M/Y Olga.  In a series of conversations over email and the 
telephone, Captain Calot, while in Puerto Rico, hired Michelle 
Trotter (“Trotter”), while in Florida, to work as a chef on M/Y 
Olga.  On December 19, 2012, Trotter boarded M/Y Olga in 
                                              
1 The record does not provide information on 7R Charters’s 
principal place of business but the District Court stated, 
without citation, that it is a British Virgin Islands corporation.   
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St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands (“USVI”).  On December 24, 
2012, M/Y Olga traveled to Scrub Island, BVI, and let down 
its anchor.  Trotter allegedly sustained an injury while 
descending stairs that connected M/Y Olga to Scrub Island’s 
dock.  Shortly after the accident, Trotter received treatment for 
her alleged injuries at a BVI hospital and then flew back to 
Florida.   
 Trotter sued Rubi, 7R Holdings, and M/Y Olga 
(“Appellees”) in the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
pursuant to the Jones Act and general maritime laws for the 
personal injury that she claims that she sustained on Scrub 
Island.  Appellees moved to dismiss Trotter’s complaint for 
forum non conveniens.   
 The District Court granted the motion.  The District 
Court, relying on Eurofins Pharma U.S. Holdings v. 
BioAlliance Pharma SA, 623 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2010), divided 
its decision into two parts.  First, it found that the alternative 
forum, the BVI, qualified as an adequate alternative forum.  
Second, it held that the balance of the public and private 
interests overcame Trotter’s choice of forum.   
 On appeal, Trotter raises two issues.  First, Trotter 
argues that, as a matter of law, we should vacate the District 
Court’s decision because the District Court failed to perform a 
choice of law analysis before dismissing Trotter’s complaint 
pursuant to forum non conveniens.  Second, Trotter asserts that 
we should vacate the District Court’s decision because the 
District Court abused its discretion by granting the motion to 
dismiss pursuant to forum non conveniens.  Appellees insist 
that these arguments lack merit.  We agree and will affirm.  
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II.2 
 In resolving this case, we must address two issues.  
First, did the District Court err in failing to determine whether 
U.S. law applies before deciding forum non conveniens?  
Second, did the District Court abuse its discretion in dismissing 
Trotter’s claims for forum non conveniens?  We review the first 
question de novo, Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l (USA) Corp., 
709 F.3d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 2013), and the second question for 
abuse of discretion, Kisano Trade & Invest Ltd. v. Lemster, 737 
F.3d 869, 872 (3d Cir. 2013). 
A. 
 The District Court did not err in failing to determine 
whether U.S. law applies before dismissing the case for forum 
non conveniens.  This conclusion rests on the Supreme Court’s 
forum non conveniens jurisprudence.  
 The Supreme Court, “in one form of words or another, 
has repeatedly recognized the existence of the power to decline 
jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances.”  Gulf Oil Corp. v. 
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947).  One example of this power 
is the principle of forum non conveniens.  “The principle of 
forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist 
imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is 
authorized by the letter of a general venue statute.”  Id. at 507.  
A court may exercise this power when litigating the case in the 
                                              
2  Trotter invoked the District Court’s jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  Trotter filed a timely notice of appeal on April 
17, 2016.  This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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chosen forum would either oppress a defendant “out of all 
proportion to plaintiff’s convenience” or cause the court 
“administrative and legal problems.”  Piper Aircraft Co., 454 
U.S. at 241 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 In deciding whether a venue would oppress a defendant, 
courts may consider “private interests,” such as access to proof, 
availability of process, and other practical issues.  Gulf Oil, 330 
U.S. at 508.  In determining whether a venue would cause 
administrative or legal problems, courts may consider “public 
interests,” such as the burdens on the courts and local juries.  
Id. at 508–09.  “[T]he combination and weight of factors 
requisite to given results are difficult to forecast or state . . . .”  
Id. at 508.  As a result, “The forum non conveniens 
determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial 
court” and “[i]t may be reversed only when there has been a 
clear abuse of discretion.”  Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 257.  
“[W]here the court has considered all relevant public and 
private interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors 
is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference.”  Id. 
 In Piper Aircraft Co., a case involving wrongful-death 
actions, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he possibility of a 
change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given 
conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non 
conveniens inquiry.”  Id. at 247 (emphasis added).  The 
Supreme Court came to this conclusion because privileging 
this factor would prevent the doctrine from serving private and 
public interests.  It would undermine the private interests 
because “[i]f substantial weight were given to the possibility of 
an unfavorable change in law . . . , dismissal might be barred 
even where trial in the chosen forum was plainly 
inconvenient.”  Id. at 249.  It would harm the public interests 
because “[i]f the possibility of a change in law were given 
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substantial weight . . . [c]hoice-of-law analysis would become 
extremely important, and the courts would frequently be 
required to interpret the law of foreign jurisdictions.”  Id. at 
251. 
 In at least two situations, however, the Supreme Court 
has concluded that choice of law questions must receive 
substantial or conclusive weight in forum non conveniens 
decisions.  First, “if the remedy provided by the alternative 
forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no 
remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be given 
substantial weight.”  Id. at 254.  Second, a “plaintiff’s choice 
of a forum cannot be defeated on the basis of forum non 
conveniens” when “the special venue act under which those 
cases are brought [is] believed to require it.”  Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. 
at 505.  Special venue acts “specifically provide[] where venue 
may be had in any suit on a cause of action arising under that 
statute.”  Id. at 506.   
 The Supreme Court has found that at least two special 
venue acts prohibited courts from dismissing cases for forum 
non conveniens.  In the first case, Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. 
Kepner, the Court held that Congress gave “[a] privilege of 
venue” to sue pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act 
and that “this right of action cannot be frustrated for reasons of 
convenience or expense.”  314 U.S. 44, 54 (1941).  In the 
second case, United States v. National City Lines, the Court 
concluded, “In the face of th[e Clayton Act’s] history we 
cannot say that room was left for judicial discretion to apply 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens so as to deprive the 
plaintiff of the choice given by the section.”  334 U.S. 573, 588 
(1948).  Congress subsequently superseded these Supreme 
Court decisions by enacting the domestic-transfer statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012), which allows a district court to 
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“transfer any civil action to any other district or division where 
it might have been brought” for “the convenience of parties and 
witnesses, in the interest of justice.”  Id.; see United States v. 
Nat’l City Lines, Inc., 337 U.S. 78 (1949) (recognizing that § 
1404(a) allows for the transfer of Clayton Act suits); Ex parte 
Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949) (recognizing that § 1404(a) allows 
for the transfer of Federal Employers’ Liability Act suits). 
 Trotter does not recognize Piper Aircraft Co.’s general 
presumption against giving choice of law “substantial weight 
in the forum non conveniens inquiry,” 454 U.S. at 247, or the 
two exceptions to this rule.  We, however, do recognize this 
rule and its exceptions.  As a result, we address whether either 
of the two exceptions apply here.  We answer these questions, 
even though Trotter did not raise them in her written or oral 
communications to us, because they are antecedent legal issues 
that we must resolve before deciding the case as a whole.  See 
Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Probation & Parole, 667 
F.3d 408, 412–13 (3d Cir. 2012).   
 We conclude that the first exception does not apply 
because the District Court correctly held that the alternative 
forum would recognize Trotter’s negligence claims.  As a 
result, this is not a case where “the remedy provided by the 
alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that 
it is no remedy at all.”  Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 254.   
 We hold that the second exception—the special venue 
provision exception—does not apply either.  When Congress 
passed the Jones Act, it sought “to provide liberal recovery for 
injured workers,” Kernan v. Am. Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 
432 (1958), and included a “special venue provision” that 
“provided a more generous choice of forum than would have 
been available at that time under the general venue statute,” 
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Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 204–05 (1966).  The 
special venue provision, as originally enacted, read as follows: 
“Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the 
district in which the defendant employer resides or in which 
his principal office is located.”  The Merchant Marine Act, 
Pub. L. No. 66-261, § 20, 41 Stat. 988 (1920). 3   The 
contemporaneous general venue statute, by contrast, omitted 
any reference to the location of “his principal office” and 
instead only allowed plaintiffs to sue a defendant “in the 
district where he resides.”  Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, § 52, 36 
Stat. 1101 (1913).  
 Congress amended the Jones Act in 2008 by striking the 
special venue provision in its entirety.  Because of this 
amendment, we conclude that Piper Aircraft Co.’s general 
presumption—that choice of law decisions are not entitled to 
substantial weight in the forum non conveniens analyses—
controls, and the special-venue exception does not apply to the 
Jones Act.  
 The Amendment’s legislative history does not question 
this conclusion.  In passing this amendment, the House of 
Representatives Committee on the Judiciary published a report 
that explained that it did not intend to change the substantive 
law: “This subsection is being repealed to make clearer that the 
prior law regarding venue, including the holding of Pure Oil 
Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202 (1966) and the cases following it, 
                                              
3  Jurisdiction means venue in this context.  Pan. R. Co. v. 
Johnson , 264 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1924) (“[T]he provision is 
not intended to affect the general jurisdiction of the District 
Courts as defined in section 24, but only to prescribe the venue 
for actions brought under the new act of which it is a part.”).  
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remains in effect, so that the action may be brought wherever 
the seaman’s employer does business.”  H.R. Rep. 110–437, 5 
(2007).  Pure Oil Co. held that 28 U.S.C. § 1391 expanded the 
Jones Act’s “reside[nce]” requirement and the availability of 
venue from the defendant’s place of incorporation and place of 
principal office to the place of incorporation, the place of 
license, and the place where the corporation does business.  384 
U.S. at 203–05, 206.  It observed that the Jones Act contained 
a “special venue provision.”  Id. at 204.  This case, as cited in 
the legislative history, did not concern forum non conveniens 
at all, but instead focused on the proper scope of venue under 
the Jones Act.  Thus, neither Pure Oil Co. nor the legislative 
history undermines our conclusion. 
 Our sister courts of appeals’ decisions do not give us 
pause.  Of the five circuits to consider the question, three 
concluded that the Jones Act, as originally enacted, contained 
a special venue provision that prohibited forum non conveniens 
dismissal.  See, e.g., Vasquez v. YII Shipping Co., 692 F.3d 
1192, 1197 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Under the federal maritime 
choice-of-law test, applicable to Jones Act seafarers in federal 
district court, a case should not be dismissed on grounds of 
forum non conveniens if federal maritime law applies to the 
case . . . .”); Loya v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, 
Inc., 583 F.3d 656, 662 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[I]n Jones Act cases 
. . . a court must first make a choice of law determination before 
dismissing for forum non conveniens.”); Needham v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co. of Nor., 719 F.2d 1481, 1483 (10th Cir. 1983) 
(“In order to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the 
trial court must conduct a choice of law analysis in order to 
determine whether American or foreign law governs.  If 
American law is applicable to the case, the forum non 
conveniens doctrine is inapplicable.”).  But see Camejo v. 
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Ocean Drilling & Expl., 838 F.2d 1374, 1379 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(“We therefore, expressly disapprove of and overrule our Jones 
Act and general maritime caselaw that utilizes a modified 
forum non conveniens analysis.”); Cruz v. Mar. Co. of Phil., 
702 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1983) (“To summarize, when the 
Jones Act is applicable[,] federal law is involved and the 
district court must exercise its power to adjudicate, absent 
some exceptional circumstances such as the application of the 
abstention doctrine or, as here, the equitable principle of forum 
non conveniens.”).  In DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895 
(3d Cir. 1977), we indicated our support for the majority rule, 
but both Congress’s repeal of the Jones Act’s special venue 
provision and Piper Aircraft Co. call this majority rule into 
question.  See id. (describing DeMateos’s interpretation as 
“dictum”).   The absence of a special venue provision in the 
Jones Act demonstrates that there is no special-venue 
exception to the normal forum non conveniens approach and 
therefore no choice of law inquiry is required.  
B. 
 Having found that neither exception to the general 
presumption against giving choice of law questions substantial 
weight in forum non conveniens decisions applies, we review 
the District Court’s decision for abuse of discretion.  Kisano 
Trade & Invest Ltd., 737 F.3d at 872.  
 Here, the District Court did not abuse its discretion.  
“[W]hen considering a motion to dismiss on forum non 
conveniens grounds, a district court must first determine 
whether an adequate alternate forum can entertain the case.”  
Eurofins Pharma US Holdings, 623 F.3d at 160 (alteration in 
original).  After finding that an adequate alternative forum 
exists, the district court must “determine[] the amount of 
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deference due to the plaintiff’s choice of forum” and “balance 
the relevant private and public interest factors.”  Id.   
 The private interest factors include: “access to sources 
of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of 
unwilling . . . witnesses;” “the cost of obtaining attendance of 
willing . . . witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view 
would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical 
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and 
inexpensive.”  Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508.   
 The public interest factors include: the possibility of 
turning courts into “congested centers;” the likelihood that the 
case will burden a jury composed of people with “no relation 
to the litigation;” the probability that the case will “touch the 
affairs of many persons” in the community; and the chances 
that the court will be “at home with the . . . law that must govern 
the case.”  Id. at 508–09.   
 In articulating these factors, the Supreme Court 
repeatedly emphasized the district court’s discretion in 
selecting and reviewing factors.  “Wisely, it has not been 
attempted to catalogue the circumstances which will justify or 
require either grant or denial of remedy” and that “the 
combination and weight of factors requisite to given results are 
difficult to forecast or state.”  Id. at 508.  As a result, this list 
of factors is both over and under inclusive: “This list of 
considerations to be balanced is by no means exhaustive, and 
some factors may not be relevant in the context of a particular 
case.”  Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 528–29 
(1988).  “The moving defendant must show that an adequate 
alternative forum exists as to all defendants and, if so, that the 
private and public interest factors weigh heavily on the side of 
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dismissal.”  Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 862 F.2d 38, 44 (3d 
Cir. 1988).  
1.  
 In this case, the District Court found that the BVI could 
serve as an adequate alternative forum (a) because the BVI’s 
judicial process resembled the USVI’s legal procedures; (b) 
because the Defendants “have stipulated that they will submit 
themselves to the jurisdiction of the BVI courts;”4  and (c) 
because the BVI’s law would recognize Trotter’s negligence 
claim.  Trotter v. 7R Holdings, LLC, No. CV 2014-99, 2016 
WL 1271025, at *2–3 (D.V.I. Mar. 30, 2016).  
 Trotter appeals two facets of this conclusion.  First, she 
argues that the BVI could not serve as an adequate alternative 
forum because “it has no jurisdiction over any of the 
Defendants.”  Appellant’s Br. at 25.  Trotter asserts this 
contention despite her acknowledgement, and the District 
Court’s finding, that the Appellees have “stipulated that they 
will submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the BVI courts.”  
Trotter, 2016 WL 1271025, at *2.  Trotter asks us to question 
this finding on the grounds that “[a] statement by counsel in a 
brief is not binding on the party or enforceable in any court.”  
Appellant’s Br. at 26.  We reject this argument and side with 
the District Court because “one cannot casually cast aside 
representations, oral or written, in the course of litigation” and 
because “a reviewing court may properly consider the 
                                              
4 At Oral Argument, Appellees’ counsel consented to service 
on behalf of all of his clients.  Oral Arg. Recording at 24:00–
25:30, http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/16-
1967Trotterv.7RHoldingsLLC.mp3. 
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representations made in the appellate brief to be binding as a 
form of judicial estoppel.”  EF Operating Corp. v. Am. Bldgs., 
993 F.2d 1046, 1050 (3d Cir. 1993).   
 Second, she claims that the BVI is not an adequate 
alternative forum because “Defendants have not established 
that BVI law provides any theory for Plaintiff to recover 
against Defendants.”  Appellant’s Br. at 25.  Trotter rests this 
claim on the observation that U.S. law provides a more 
favorable liability standard than the common law.  She notes 
that “the Jones Act and unseaworthiness causes of action allow 
a condition on the dock to be imputed to Defendants even 
though they do not control the area where the seaman is 
injured” and that “a seaman injured in the service of the ship, 
even on shore leave, is entitled to maintenance and cure 
without any fault on the part of the vessel.”  Id. at 28.   
 We find this argument unpersuasive.  In Piper Aircraft 
Co., the Supreme Court held that a district court properly 
dismissed a claim under forum non conveniens and held that 
“there is no danger that [the plaintiffs] will be deprived of any 
remedy” even though the plaintiffs “may not be able to rely on 
a strict liability theory.”  454 U.S. at 255.  Trotter’s argument 
mirrors the argument rejected by Piper Aircraft Co. because, 
in both cases, the plaintiffs claimed that U.S.—but not the 
foreign—law would allow them to recover without proving the 
defendants’ negligence or fault.  Because Trotter makes an 
argument that resembles the argument rejected by the Supreme 
Court in Piper Aircraft Co., we affirm the District Court on this 
issue. 
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2.  
 The District Court held that, although Trotter’s choice 
should receive “great deference” because she is a U.S. citizen, 
the “balance of the public and private factors clearly favors an 
alternate forum.”  Trotter, 2016 WL 1271025, at *4 (citing 
Windt v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 529 F.3d 183, 190 (3d 
Cir. 2008)).  Private factors counseled in favor of dismissal, the 
District Court found, (a) because no fact witness resided in the 
USVI; (b) because the accident occurred on either a vessel 
owned by a BVI corporation or on a piece of land in the BVI; 
and (c) because litigating the case in the USVI would cause the 
parties to “incur significant expenses.”  Id. at *5–6.  Public 
factors supported dismissal, the District Court held, because it 
would be unfair to subject the citizens of the USVI to deciding 
a dispute that hinged on foreign evidence and foreign law and 
because the other factors came out as neutral.   
 Trotter appeals this decision by arguing that the District 
Court should have weighed these factors differently and should 
have considered additional factors.  In making this argument, 
though, Trotter provides no persuasive case law.  Indeed, the 
two cases that she claims most support her position differ from 
the instant case in important respects.  
 In the first case, Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., Graeme 
Lacey suffered injuries in a plane crash in Canada and sued 
three of the plane’s manufacturers in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania.  932 F.2d 170, 172 (3d Cir. 1991). 5   The 
                                              
5  We do not address Lacey’s predecessor, Lacey v. Cessna 
Aircraft Co., 862 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1988), at length.  In the prior 
case, we reversed the district court because it had granted the 
defendants’ forum non conveniens motion even though the 
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manufacturers successfully moved to dismiss the case pursuant 
to the court’s forum non conveniens power.  Id.  In granting the 
motion, the district court recognized the potential difficulty in 
compelling U.S. witnesses to appear in Canada and 
conditioned its dismissal “on defendants making all relevant 
witnesses and documents in their control available to plaintiff 
in the alternative forum for discovery and trial, at defendants’ 
expense.”  Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 736 F. Supp. 662, 664 
(W.D. Pa. 1990).  On appeal, we reversed in four steps.  First, 
we observed that relevant evidence related to the plane’s 
exhaust system, a product that a Pennsylvania-based defendant 
allegedly manufactured.  Lacey, 932 F.2d at 173.  Second, we 
noted that the Pennsylvania-based defendant “now represents 
that no documents relating to or personnel familiar with the 
company’s prior aircraft exhaust business are under its 
control.”  Id.  Third, because Lacey’s claims depended on 
evidence related to the exhaust system and because no 
defendant controlled this evidence, we concluded that the 
court’s conditional dismissal, which compelled defendants to 
produce all relevant witnesses and documents in the Canadian 
court, could not “ensure [Lacey’s] access to sources of proof.”  
Id.  Fourth, the inadequacy of the conditional dismissal 
mattered because Canada’s procedural laws prevented Lacey 
from obtaining evidence within the control of non-parties in 
the United States.  Id. at 173–74.   
                                              
defendants “submitted no evidence to support their 
contentions, except for a copy of a pleading filed in the British 
Columbia litigation.”  Lacey, 862 F.2d at 44.  Here, the 
Appellees submitted affidavits to bolster their claims.  As a 
result, Lacey’s predecessor provides little guidance and 
requires minimal attention. 
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 Unlike in Lacey, the relevant evidence in the case at bar 
rests in the alternative forum.  To prove her claims, Trotter may 
require documents from BVI companies, witnesses from the 
scene of her accident in the BVI, and access to the relevant 
dock in the BVI.  Thus, our reasoning in Lacey does not apply 
here.    
 In the second case, Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & 
Co., Adolf Lony, a German sole proprietorship, bought 
cellophane from Du Pont, a Delaware corporation, and sold it 
to Haribo, a German corporation.  886 F.2d 628, 630 (3d Cir. 
1989).6  During the transaction, Du Pont told Lony that the 
cellophane did not contain a specific toxic chemical.  Id.  When 
it received the cellophane, Haribo discovered that it contained 
the specific toxic chemical and canceled its contract with Lony.  
Id.  Lony claimed that it suffered a loss and sued Du Pont in 
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.  
Id. at 631.  Du Pont successfully moved for forum non 
conveniens and Lony appealed.  Id.  We reversed, inter alia, 
because the District Court abused its discretion in weighing the 
private and public interests.  Id. at 643–44.  It specifically 
abused its discretion in weighing the private interests, we held, 
because it regarded the private interest factors as standing in 
“equipoise or tipped to the defendant” but incorrectly 
                                              
6 We need not dwell on Lony’s progeny, Lony v. E.I. Du Pont 
de Nemours & Co., 935 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1991).  In the 
subsequent case, we reversed the district court because of its 
“failure to consider the extent of merits activity already 
completed and underway in Delaware.”  Lony, 935 F.2d at 613.  
Here, the District Court did not allow any discovery, let alone 
the six months of discovery at issue in Lony’s progeny.  As a 
result, Lony’s progeny merits little discussion.  
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concluded that this balance “favors dismissal.”  Id. at 640.  It 
abused its discretion in considering the public interest factors, 
we found, because it erroneously assumed that only foreign 
law would apply to Lony’s claims in a U.S. court.  Id. at 642–
43.  
 Neither of these issues applies to the case at bar.  With 
regard to the private interest factors, Lony’s analysis does not 
extend to this case because the District Court did not regard the 
private interest factors as standing in equipoise.  Instead, it held 
that two of the “factor[s] counsel[ed] in favor of dismissal” and 
that one “factor strongly favor[ed] the case being heard in the 
BVI.”  Trotter, 2016 WL 1271025, at *6.  With respect to the 
public interest factors, Lony’s holding does not apply because 
the District Court did not assume that foreign law applied.  
Rather, the District Court “[wa]s uncertain whether United 
States law or BVI law would apply” and, as a result, 
“refrain[ed] from attributing much weight to this particular 
factor.”  Id. at *7.  Because the District Court reasonably 
balanced the private and public interest factors, we will affirm 
the District Court on this issue.  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order of dismissal.  
